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abstract
My contribution consists in an interview with Martha Craven Nussbaum, one of the most popular 
philosophers of our time. Following the questions raised by the interviewer, Nussbaum introduces her 
book Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, Harvard University Press (2013). Developing 
the interview in Phenomenology and Mind, 3, 2012 (pp. 160-165), here Nussbaum focuses on emotions 
influence on political life, specifically considering emotions as a possible cognitive way to access the 
values and to inform people acts. Among the most prominent topics, she points out the idea of a “civil 
religion”.
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AN INTERVIEW WITH MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM
Martha Craven Nussbaum (born May 6, 1947) is a philosopher and Professor at the University 
of Chicago (http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/nussbaum/). Her major research areas 
include ancient philosophy, ethics, politics, law, etc. One of the most popular philosophers of 
our time, Nussbaum is interested in the foundation of ethics and politics on emotional life, 
starting from the Aristotelian theory of the “good life” and going deep into liberal and Indian 
thought. She is well known for her civil commitment: she has been dealing actively with 
human rights for years, holding important international offices such as the membership of the 
Committee on Southern Asian Studies and Founding Presidency of the Human Development 
and Capability Association. Together with Amartya Sen, she defends a Capability Approach to 
justice, also suggesting development policies. 
In the present interview the author introduces her last impressive book, Political Emotions: 
Why Love Matters for Justice, Harvard University Press (2013). The core of this book is the 
insight into emotions influence on political life, when specifically considering emotions as a 
possible cognitive way to access the values and to inform people acts. Nussbaum talks about 
a “civil religion”, that is a cultivation of emotions necessary to politics in order to promote 
people confidence in social institutions as well as people involvement in social institutions 
improvement. 
What makes such a “religion” possible? As we know, emotions in politics can play both a 
positive and a negative role. How can emotions have positive influence on politics? What is the 
challenge of emotions in politics? Is there a possible link between emotions, justice and human 
acts? 
The present interview develops and enriches the one conducted by Emanuele Caminada 
and me to Martha Nussbaum 3 years ago (Phenomenology and Mind, 3, 2012, pp. 160-165). 
The concepts there still in nuce are now disclosed, enlightening the real interest of the 
author intuitions about the relationship between emotions and political life. Among the 
most prominent points of interest, we point out the following ones: the fact that a society is 
required to be well ordered; the need to overcome a neutral idea of “civil religion” without 
admitting, for this reason, an illiberal society; the possibility of a cognitive ethics which is 
different from a metaphysical one and which takes into serious consideration the theme of 
dissent.
1. In our last interview we asked you how emotions and values are related in your view. You 
answered that “emotions always contains appraisals of an object as either good or bad for the 
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creature who has the emotion. So in that sense they contain values”. Can you kindly precise 
this statement and give us some examples? 
Emotions are distinct from mere feelings (feeling hot, feeling cold, feeling pain), and also 
distinct from bodily appetites such as hunger and thirst, since they point at an object: joy, 
grief, fear, anger, envy, compassion … all are about something, a person or an event. But 
not all object stimulate emotions: only those that seem important from the point of view of 
well-being. The standard evolutionary account of emotions is that they evolved because they 
steer creatures away from danger and toward things that are good for them, by giving a kind 
of “news headline”: HERE IS SOMETHING BAD (or: GOOD). For example: we don’t feel fear 
every time a small insect comes across our path, but we do feel fear if we appraise the animal 
as dangerous: a snake, a tiger, a lion. Sometimes our fears are mistaken: Aristotle already 
mentions people who fear a mouse running across the floor. But it is because the person thinks 
that the mouse is a big danger (mistakenly) that she feels fear. Again, we don’t feel grief every 
time someone in the world dies: only when we think it is a person really important to us. So 
emotions contain a road-map of what we think important to our well-being and thus contain 
values in that sense. These are not necessarily moral values of course. 
2. As we already asked you, In Political Emotions you connect pillars of your philosophy: your 
cognitive theory of emotional life and your capability approach as a theory of justice. Can you 
better explain why emotions and political principles are deeply interrelated? 
All societies need to think about stability: indeed a reasonable degree of stability seems 
necessary to justify a set of political principles. So all societies need to think about how 
citizens will learn to care about and support the things that are crucial to the political 
principles. But a society based upon my “capabilities approach” will need to think more about 
the emotions than many other types of society, for two reasons. First, my approach requires 
a great deal of redistribution of wealth and income between rich and poor, and this requires 
a very robust sense of a common good and an extensive altruism and willingness to sacrifice. 
Second, my society includes as equals people who are often views with fear or disgust: racial 
and sexual minorities, immigrants, etc. So it won’t be enough to pass a good set of tax laws: 
if people don’t love their fellow citizens and want them to flourish they will just change the 
laws, and they will simply do away with the whole social safety net if their hearts don’t want 
it. Racial animosity can’t be overcome by law alone, but only by a spirit of brotherhood and 
fellow-feeling.
3. What emotions and political principles should a liberal society promote? We are used to 
believe that emotions are promoted by illiberal society. Is there a difference between liberal 
and illiberal society way to promote emotions? Can liberal values, such as freedom and 
autonomy, be conciliated with public care of emotions?
As I point out, the interest in emotions was not, historically, promoted by illiberal thinkers: 
it originated with Rousseau, Mazzini, John Stuart Mill, all of them great liberals (though 
Rousseau is complicated here!). But one has to be very careful if one is a liberal to make sure 
that the public cultivation of emotions is compatible with liberal freedom and a vigorous 
critical culture. This is one of the prominent themes of my book. A nation that cultivates 
emotions (of racial brotherhood, for example) must also strongly protect dissenting speech 
and peaceful protest, and it must convey the idea that individuality is prized, not repressed. 
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Indeed, I give many examples of how emotion comes to be attached to the very idea of a 
vigorous critical culture. The most popular book in US schools is To Kill a Mockingbird, a 
story of passionate dissent and critique. The liberal message is the more powerful for being 
conveyed in an emotionally powerful narrative. 
4. In our last interview we asked you if a right exists independently of legal guarantees. You 
answered “Yes, since rights inhere in human dignity itself”. What is human dignity in your 
perspective? 
I think that the notion of human dignity has very little independent content, and should 
not be treated as a debate-stopper, as if it has self-evident content on its own. It derives its 
meaning as part of a fabric of principles and judgments. But the very thin content the notion 
does have is that of being treated as an end, not as a mere means. Of course I think that 
animals all have dignity, not just the human ones.
5. In the historical part of Political Emotions you refer to a cosmopolitan tradition: Rousseau, 
Herder, Mazzini. They talk about a “civil religion”. What do they mean with ‘civil religion’? Do 
you agree with them in considering “civil religion” as the ideal of a cosmopolitan society? 
I’m not sure why you call this a cosmopolitan tradition. I myself don’t, and I think it would not 
be appropriate, since Rousseau was quite opposed to ideas of global brotherhood, although 
Mazzini favored them. I myself think that global justice is an important part of what a good 
nation should try to promote, but not all the thinkers in the tradition I describe would 
agree with that statement. What they mean by “civil religion” is a set of public practices 
that form sentiments that support the political principles. In the nineteenth century it was 
generally thought that the “civil religion” would eventually replace the usual religions, and 
that we would just stop being Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, etc. and get our emotional 
nourishment entirely from our nation’s public culture. Today we don’t think this is an 
appropriate idea, since we think a decent society must respect people’s religious attachments. 
So the term “civil religion” does not seem appropriate today, and I do not use it of my own 
proposals. 
6. In your work you say that your political liberalism owes a lot to Kant and Locke perspective, 
but it also moves further. How does it move further? What are the problems of neutrality in a 
liberal view of politics?
Rousseau saw the need for emotions in sustaining the political principles of a society – but 
he did not understand the importance of protecting dissent and diversity. His “civil religion” 
was thus very dictatorial, imposing harsh penalties on people who did not affirm it. Locke and 
Kant, by contrast, understood the importance of protecting freedoms of speech and belief – 
but they neglected the whole question of political emotion. Locke does urge people to cultivate 
a spirit of charity and compassion, when he talks about religious toleration, but he proposes 
no public project for supporting these good emotions and discouraging the bad ones. Kant, 
too, thinks that people should cultivate a fraternal spirit toward one another, but he does not 
propose any public mechanism for this. His views on the emotions are not well-developed in 
any case, and he has little of value to contribute on that topic.
As for neutrality: I don’t think that a good society should be ethically neutral. A good society 
must be in favor of human equality, not inequality, in favor of anti-racism not racism, and 
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so forth. Its political principles should express a definite moral vision. But it is a vision that 
is incomplete, deliberately, leaving lots of spaces within which citizens pursue their own 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, whether religious or secular. Indeed in order to show 
equal respect to citizens it must refrain from taking up too much space, so to speak. And it 
ought to remain neutral on metaphysical matters, such as the existence and destiny of the 
soul, that divide people along lines of religious and creed.
7. What do you think about political dissent? 
Dissent is crucial to the health of any society, and is to be strongly encouraged, so long as 
it takes a peaceful form. I myself think that dissent ought to be not only peaceful but also 
courteous and respectful, but I don’t think that we should limit public expression on grounds 
of civility – only on grounds of an imminent threat to public safety. I do support traditional 
laws of defamation that protect individuals whom hostile speech has harmed, but I strongly 
oppose laws banning “group defamation,” on the grounds that they lead to the persecution of 
scholars and other dissenters.
8. In your work it seems that John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore are the two thinkers 
you agree with most. In which sense do you agree with them? 
Both Mill and Tagore understood that true human development requires a lot of space 
for individual self-expression. So they advocated a lot of material support for human 
capabilities (Mill was a socialist, and Tagore’s interest in the material development of rural 
India was a lifelong passion), while also defending liberties of speech, association, and 
expression. And both felt that the arts were keys to this new type of freedom. Mill advocated 
“aesthetic education” as a key to the advancement of humanity, although he never gave 
much detail about his program. Tagore gives us a lot more detail, because he actually 
founded a school and university that were based on critical thinking and the arts. The school 
had worldwide influence, and was imitated by educational reformers in Europe and North 
America. So I agree with their basic conception of human development, and with their sense 
that a kind of passionate love of others, of the sort that poetry and music nourish, is key to a 
healthy society.
9. Among the other emotions, you focus your attention on disgust. Power of disgust can be 
very aggressive in excluding abnormal subjects and disgust probably protect us from fear of 
our own fragility. How could disgust be conciliated with more inclusive emotions, such as love 
and compassion, and how should we consider human fragility?
One should bear in mind that I have written two prior books about disgust, both of which have 
appeared in Italian translation: Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (2004), and 
From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (2010). So the treatment of 
disgust in Political Emotions builds upon these prior lengthier discussions. What I say there is 
that disgust probably has an evolutionary origin, and that its original function was to keep us 
away from things that are genuinely dangerous, like rotting food, corpses, and human waste 
products. Disgust, research shows, does not track the dangerous very well: there are many 
dangerous foods that are not found disgusting (poisonous mushrooms, for example), and 
many non-dangerous substances that are found disgusting (such as a cockroach that has been 
sterilized and sealed in a plastic capsule!). But on the whole the overlap is great enough that 
disgust was useful. Even now, when we can test for bacterial contamination, it is often good to 
263
AN INTERVIEW WITH MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM
follow disgust: for example, if the milk smells disgusting, it’s better to throw it out, rather than 
to wait for the results of a laboratory test! 
Even “primary disgust,” meaning disgust at human waste products and corpses, has 
problematic tendencies: for as we flee contamination from these parts of ourselves we often 
tell ourselves that this is “not us,” and that we are not really animals who excrete and die. 
Bad attitudes to sexuality and death often result. But a far worse set of problems comes 
with what I call “projective disgust”: the projection of disgust properties (such as bad smell, 
foulness, animality) onto groups of people. The dominant group says, “These are animals, and 
we should avoid contact with them.” Think of the irrationality of U.S. racists, who refused 
to share drinking fountains, lunch counters, and swimming pools with African-Americans. 
The irrational fear of contamination turns into a horrible mechanism of exclusion and 
subordination. I do not agree with you that it is “abnormal subjects” who are excluded. In 
India, untouchability applied to a very large proportion of the population for no reason at 
all. (You can’t identify a dalit by any physical trait, only by a hereditary name.) In the US, 
racism was applied to a very substantial part of the population. Other groups targeted for 
disgust in various times and places include Jews, gays and lesbians – and women, who happen 
to be the majority in most societies. I think you are referring to the application of projective 
disgust to people with physical and mental disabilities. However, when we consider that aging 
people often fall into this class, that class, too, is extremely large, and could not be considered 
“abnormal” in any statistical sense. Nor is it “abnormal” in any normative sense: weakness, 
disability, and vulnerability are facts of human life. 
Now to your question: what should we do? Part of this work belongs to the family, as it brings 
children up, as far as possible, without “projective disgust” and without too much disgust at 
primary objects. Toilet training has changed a lot in the past century, and children are no 
longer encouraged to feel disgust with their waste products, but, rather, encouraged with 
positive reinforcement to please parents by learning to use the toilet. This is very good, and it 
is perfectly compatible with sensible policies promoting sanitation. But a part of this work also 
needs to go on in societies, by promoting the sense of joy and delight in physical proximity, 
as through festivals of many sorts that bring people together across racial and ethnic lines. 
Sports are another powerful vehicle of overcoming disgust, as Nelson Mandela wisely saw. 
When bodies are in close contact with joy and cooperation and for an attractive goal, that 
quickly undermines projective disgust. The arts also play a role: I give examples of how public 
art and public parks promote joyful physical contact.
10. In your opinion what is the power of art in politics? How can art, media, architecture and 
public music influence emotions and public life? 
The arts have enormous power, because great artists know how to go to the roots of our 
most powerful emotions. This power is not always used well, and of course fascists have also 
used the arts. But that only means that public art projects must be chosen to promote values 
compatible with the nation’s political principles. We certainly want the individuality and 
the freedom of fine artists, not socialist realism, which was a total failure, artistically and 
emotionally. So artists should be given a lot of freedom to be themselves. Still, a competition 
for a public park or monument or memorial is bound to take into account the values that are 
expressed. I discuss examples of this in my book, such as the wonderful Vietnam Veterans 




11. To what extent do you believe that political liberalism needs humanities? And what about 
nature and technical sciences? Do you think that they also contribute to liberal education?
I think a decent liberal society very urgently needs the humanities, because citizens need 
trained critical capacities and trained imaginations, and a knowledge of the world informed by 
the study of history. I certainly think that citizens need certain sorts of scientific knowledge 
too, since many decisions they will need to make concerning the environment, for example, 
require that learning. The liberal arts model of university education requires science 
courses of all students, and this should continue – but the courses are typically somewhat 
different from those that specialists in science take. I don’t spend much time discussing this 
part of liberal education because that part is not under threat at present. I think that good 
education in the scientific method has a natural affinity with humanities education, since 
both emphasize the cultivation of rational argument, critical thinking, and the evaluation of 
evidence.
12. In your perspective a liberal society contributes to shape the affective education of a 
person. How could the affective education of a person contribute to shape a liberal society? Is 
there a virtuous circle? 
Most definitely. Let me take the example of race. Parents raise children to have, let us hope, 
respectful and inclusive views on racial questions. Those children then go out and shape the 
institutions of their society, hopefully sustaining and increasing its commitment to non-
racism. The virtuous circle has to begin somewhere, however. In a situation of profound 
injustice, how do young people ever get the views that enable them to build better institutions 
and principles? Well, first of all, the excluded never endorse the views that oppress them. 
In most movements for racial justice the oppressed racial groups themselves have taken the 
leading role, as with the ANC in South Africa, or Martin Luther King, Jr.’s movement in the US. 
But both of these movements were greatly helped by white allies, and these often were people 
who grew up in families that taught them to differ from the dominant view. Nelson Mandela 
notes the great importance of South Africa’s Jewish minority in giving support to the freedom 
movement. People such as Helen Suzman, Albie Sachs, Nadine Gordimer, and many others 
grew up with values of liberal Jewish culture that opposed apartheid. Nonetheless, we should 
also note that children don’t always follow their parents, and the virtuous circle can begin 
in many ways. My father was from the deep South, and he was a very intense racist. And the 
Philadelphia in which I grew up, though not in the South, was pretty racist too. I got my non-
racist views from my schoolteachers, from the ministers in my church, from the time I spent 
acting in the theater, and just from reading and thinking on my own. 
